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I. Introduction 
Competition laws promote economic efficiency and social welfare by prohibiting 
restrictive business practices and maintaining a ‘level-playing field’. In 1998, Pitofsky 
(1998) estimated that approximately 82 countries have competition laws. The Hong 
Kong government established its competition policy in early 1998. This paper aims first 
to provide a description of the current competition policy framework in Hong Kong, 
including the historical background behind the policy, what business practices are 
covered, how the enforcement system works, and so on; and second, to provide an 
assessment of the existing competition policy of the government. 
 
There has been the general impression that Hong Kong is one of the most free market 
economies in the world. For more than half a century, the Hong Kong government has 
adopted a positive non-intervention policy, a philosophy that has dominated almost 
every aspect of its policy making. Laissez faire has been treated with great respect, and 
market forces have been regarded as the best way of allocating resources. The 
government seldom, if ever, attempts to fine-tune the level of macroeconomic 
activities, and has continuously fought to keep intervention into the market system at 
the minimum. However, the general impression is not entirely true. The government 
has monopolistic control over all land, the vital resource of Hong Kong.  Through land 
sales and zoning policies, the government can exercise significant influence over 
business activities.   
 
It is also generally believed that the Hong Kong economy is highly competitive.  While 
Hong Kong is truly competitive in international markets in terms of exports and the 
ability to attract foreign investment, this competitiveness does not mean, nor does it 
ensure, that competition exists among firms in domestic markets.  In service sectors 
where import substitution is not applicable, monopolistic markets can still exist in 
widely open economies. In the earlier days under British rule, there were no 
government-owned businesses (except the railway, water works, and postal services), 
but monopolists did exist in some industries with the blessing of the government in 
favor of British companies such as Cable and Wireless (in telecommunications) and 
Cathay Pacific (in airlines).  These companies were labeled as “benign” monopolists.  
The Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank was given the status of a quasi central bank with 
some privileges such as the authority to issue money.  Preferences were also granted to 
 2 
British insurance companies, securities intermediaries and legal firms.1  An explicit 
interest rate cartel on deposit accounts among licensed banks existed for over two 
decades before July 2001 when it was demolished by the government. There was 
therefore never a level-playing field in many of the non-tradable sectors in Hong Kong. 
 
For a long time, the Hong Kong government never considered the lack of competition 
in some sectors to be a problem.  It was believed that monopolists had important 
purposes to serve.  The general public has various misconceptions about the role of 
antitrust (see section VI for more details). In particular, it tends to confuse free 
competition (laissez faire) with fair or perfect competition, and international 
competitiveness with competition among domestic firms.  Both the government and the 
public believe that antitrust is necessarily a government interventionist policy resulting 
in distortion of the functions of a free market system. Given these, it is not surprising 
that it has been a difficult task to develop a competition law under the laissez-faireism 
in Hong Kong.  
 
Section II of the paper discusses the Hong Kong Consumer Council’s recommendation 
in 1996 on a comprehensive competition law, which was based on its studies of market 
power in important industries in Hong Kong. It then presents the government’s 
response to the recommendation: instead of a general competition law, it set up a sector 
based competition policy. In sections III and IV, we take an in-depth look at how this 
competition policy functions. Recent cases from the telecommunications industry are 
used to illustrate the working of the sectoral approach. In section V, we argue that such 
an approach suffers from two fundamental drawbacks. First, due to having different 
“rules of the game” for different sectors, the allocation of resources may be distorted in 
the long run.  Second, since they perform dual roles, both as competition policy 
enforcer and as traditional regulator of natural monopolies, relevant regulatory 
agencies face an information problem: the impartiality of their competition decisions 
may not be credibly conveyed to the general public. This argument is supported by 
recent acquisition cases in the telecommunications industry, which ended with 
controversial approvals by the government that were said to have compromised the 
regulatory environment. In this section, we also address problems specific to the 
                                                           
1 Rice importation to Hong Kong has also been restricted to a few authorized enterprises. 
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current sectoral approach, which include the exclusion of structural issues, narrow 
coverage of sectors, and the lack of public enforcement. 
 
It was a quantum leap forward that an explicit competition policy, no matter how 
narrow its coverage and how well it functions, came into existence in perhaps the only 
economy in the world where the government adopts actively and proudly a 
non-intervention policy towards business activities. The Hong Kong government’s 
effort in promoting competition in recent years certainly is commendable. However, we 
believe that a broad-based competition law can better promote competition.  Section VI 
of the paper discusses various major difficulties lying ahead in establishing a modern 
antitrust system. We argue in this section that what Hong Kong really needs now, for a 
competition policy system to be effective, is to educate the public, correct the various 
misconceptions regarding antitrust, and develop a culture for fair competition. Our 
conclusions are presented in section VII. 
 
II.  The Birth of the Competition Policy 
1. THE CONSUMER COUNCIL’S RECOMMENDATION 
It was the Consumer Council of Hong Kong, a statutory body established in 1974,2 that 
took the lead in bringing to the attention of the government and the public the existence 
and consequences of monopolistic market structures in Hong Kong. In its earlier years, 
the Council engaged mainly in providing price information to consumers and censuring 
the trade malpractices of (usually) small retailers.  It has played some role in advocating 
consumer rights and protection through legislation, and has also entertained complaints 
and conducted regular product testing. In the late 1980’s, the Council, under the 
chairmanship of Edward Chen, one of the authors of this paper, developed a keen 
interest in studying the anti-competitive behavior of firms in many service sectors in 
Hong Kong.3  In October 1992, the Council launched a series of studies on market 
competition and its impact on consumer welfare. The sectors covered include the 
markets for bank deposits, supermarket sales, gas supply, telecommunications, radio 
                                                           
2 A board that consists of a chairperson, a vice-chairperson and up to 20 other members governs the 
Council.  The members of the board are appointed by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong and cannot be 
public officers.   
3 However, owing to limited resources, the progress of the study was very slow. With the arrival of the 
new Governor of Hong Kong (Mr. Chris Patten) in 1992, the Council was able to convince the 
government to earmark a grant of some 3.7 million Hong Kong dollars for conducting competition 
studies. (US$1 is about HK$7.8 under the current linked exchange rate regime of Hong Kong dollars.) 
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broadcasting, and residential property. “Low levels of competition” were found in most 
of the sectors. In November 1996, the Council published a report, entitled Competition 
Policy: The Key to Hong Kong’s Future Success. Here, it strongly recommended the 
adoption of a comprehensive competition law, which at the minimum should contain 
the following:4 
a)  Article 1: to prohibit explicit agreements between firms that are intended or 
have the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition. These 
include horizontal agreements such as those involved in price-fixing cartels, 
bid-rigging, etc., and vertical agreements such as retail price maintenance, 
exclusive dealership, tie-in sales, long-term supply contracts, etc. 
b)  Article 2: to prohibit any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position that prevents, restricts or distorts competition. This would address 
monopoly pricing, and vertical restraints such as tie-in sales enforced through 
market dominance. 
 
The Council also recommended that an independent Competition Authority be 
established with the power to investigate possible breaches of the law, and that an 
Appeal Body be set up to hear appeals against decisions by the Competition Authority. 
While comparable with existing antitrust frameworks in many other countries, the 
Council’s proposal was regarded by some as “over-encompassing and excessively 
intrusive” (Tripartite Forum (1999)). It also proved difficult for such an approach to be 
accepted in Hong Kong (at least by government officials), a place known for its free 
market system and for the positive non-intervention philosophy of the government. 
 
2. THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
One year after the publication of the Council’s report, the new SAR (Special 
Administrative Region) government responded by first establishing a Competition 
Policy Advisory Group (COMPAG) in December 1997, chaired by the Financial 
Secretary. Then in May 1998 it issued a formal policy statement, which stated that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
4 The proposed competition law also included an article controlling the abuse of collective dominance, 
and an article for the control of mergers and acquisitions. The Council, however, noted the desirability of 
deferring the introduction of the these two articles due to technical reasons, arguing that “the issues 
raised in cases involving complex monopoly are best addressed when experience has been cumulated. 
Decisions relating to mergers and acquisitions also raise difficult technical issues, which must be 
resolved within a strict time table if the ordinary conduct of business is not to be impeded” (Consumer 
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instead of introducing an overall competition law, the government had decided to set up 
a sector-specific competition policy framework.5 The government contended that an 
overall law banning anti-competitive practices “would not be able to take into account 
the specific requirement of the individual sectors,” and that having such a law would be 
“overkill”.6  It also argued that setting up an overall competition authority would be too 
expensive and would duplicate existing regulatory bodies, and that for Hong Kong, a 
small and externally-oriented economy which is already highly competitive, there is no 
need to enact an all-embracing competition law. 
 
In the policy statement, the government declared that the objective of its competition 
policy was “to enhance economic efficiency and free flow of trade, thereby also 
benefiting consumer welfare.” The government recognized that restrictive practices are 
detrimental to the overall interests of Hong Kong, and included two types of business 
practices, horizontal restraints and abuse of market position, in the policy statement.7 8 
The determination of whether a practice is restrictive or not “must be made in the light 
of the actual situation. The intended purpose and the effects of the practice in question, 
and the relevant market or economic conditions, etc., must be all taken into account.” 
Thus, the rule of reason, rather than a per se rule, will be followed in order to determine 
the legality of a conduct. This is so even for practices involving price-fixing and bid 
rigging which are normally treated as per se illegal in almost all other countries.9 
  
The government also set up its sectoral approach in its policy statement. The essence of 
this approach is to identify anti-competitive behavior and to initiate pro-competition 
measures, on a sectoral basis, through administrative or legislative measures. Put it 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Council (1996, p.76)). 
5 The policy statement is available at: http://www.info.gov.hk/tib/roles/index%5fmain.htm.  
6 South China Morning Post, November 4, 1997. See also Trade and Industry Bureau (1997, p.6). 
7 For horizontal restraints, the following practices that have the effect of impairing economic efficiency 
or free trade or intended to distort normal operation of the market were listed in the statement “for 
illustrative purpose only”: (1) Price-fixing; (2) Bid-rigging, market allocation, sales and production 
quotas; (3) Joint boycotts; and (4) Unfair or discriminatory standards among members of a trade or 
professional body (intended to deny newcomers a chance to enter or contest in the market). 
 
8 The government also set out the following examples of conduct that might involve an abuse of market 
position: (1) Predatory pricing; (2) Setting retail price minimums for products or services where there are 
no ready substitutes; and (3) Conditioning the supply of specified products or services to the purchase of 
other specified products or services or to the acceptance of certain restrictions other than to achieve 
assurance of quality, safety, adequate service or other justified purposes. 
9  According to the Secretary for Trade and Industry, many “apparently collusive agreements” can help 
firms achieve economies of scale and provide better service, and it “would not be proper to rule these out 
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differently, instead of establishing an overall legal framework for the entire economy, 
the government proposed to set different rules for different sectors to govern 
competition within the sectors concerned, with the administration of these sector-based 
rules being carried out by relevant sector-specific agencies.  
 
III. The Operation of the Sector Approach: A More Detailed Look 
Under the sectoral approach, competition rules are built into legislation, regulatory 
guidelines, and codes of conduct, for various industries. For example, the 
Telecommunications Ordinance of Hong Kong and the Broadcasting Authority 
Ordinance specify the competition principles to be followed in promoting competition 
in the telecommunications industry and the broadcasting industry. In addition, detailed 
competition provisions were incorporated in the contracts between the government and 
each individual license holder.  
 
1. COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
The Telecommunications Ordinance, amended in 2000, contains conditions relating to 
the market conduct of the licensees in all telecommunications markets. These 
conditions cover two types of conduct: anti-competitive behavior and abuse of a 
dominant position.  Anti-competitive behavior includes, but is not limited to, collusive 
agreements to fix prices, boycotting the supply of goods or services to competitors, 
entering into exclusive arrangements which prevent competitors from having access to 
supplies or outlets, and agreements between licensees to share the available market 
between them along agreed geographic or customer lines. Abuse of a dominant position 
includes, but not limited to, predatory pricing, price discrimination, the imposition of 
contractual terms which are harsh or unrelated to the subject of the contract, tying 
agreements, discrimination in supply of services to competitors, the giving of a 
preference to and the receipt of an unfair advantage from associates, and discounting by 
a dominant licensee 10 
 
The prohibitions on giving or receiving an unfair advantage from associates and 
discounting reflect the sector specifics in the telecommunications industry.  Since the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
indiscriminately (South China Morning Post, November 4, 1997). 
10 In addition to the provisions set in the Telecommunication Ordinance, the Telecommunications 
Authority also incorporates such provisions in the license contracts between the government and 
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liberalization of the telecommunications market in Hong Kong in the mid 1990s, new 
firms have entered the fixed line telephone markets, mobile phone markets, and Internet 
services markets. Due to the high fixed cost of setting up networks, some of the 
newcomers initially had to rent existing networks from the incumbent firms. The 
provision regarding transactions with one's associates is designed to guarantee fair 
competition between the newcomers, on the one hand, and downstream affiliates of 
incumbent operators, on the other. Likewise, in order to help new firms gain market 
share quickly, the Telecommunications Authority (TA) continues to exercise price 
control, as it did prior to the liberalization of the markets, over the incumbent firm 
(Hong Kong Telecom) by not allowing it to cut price beyond the regulated level in 
response to the entry of new firms. The prohibition of offering price discounts by a 
dominant licensee is designed specifically for this purpose. 
 
The TA also specifies explicitly the meaning of dominance in various markets. For the 
fixed telecommunications network service market, the TA postulates that (i) a licensee 
with a greater than 75% market share will be presumed to be dominant; (ii) a licensee 
with a less than 25% market share will be presumed to be non-dominant; and (iii) a 
licensee with a market share of between 25% to 75% will not be subject to any 
presumption.11 
 
2. COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY 
The Broadcasting Ordinance, the law that governs business practices in the 
broadcasting service markets, contains similar competition provisions, namely a 
prohibition of anti-competitive conduct which has the purpose or effect of preventing, 
distorting or substantially restricting competition in a television program service 
market, and a prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position in a television program 
service market in Hong Kong, which may affect competition in that market.12 The 
Ordinance empowers the Broadcasting Authority (BA) to enforce these competition 
provisions. On February 16, 2001, the BA issued two documents, “Guidelines to the 
Application of the Competition Provisions of the Broadcasting Ordinance (the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
individual licensees. 
11 Telecommunications Authority (1995), p.8. 
12 Practices such as price-fixing agreements (direct or indirect) between licensees can be regarded as 
anti-competitive behavior. The following practices may constitute an abuse of a dominant position: entry 
deterrence, vertical restraints, predatory pricing, subsidy and cross-subsidy among different units of a 
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Competition Guidelines)” and “Competition Investigation Procedures”. These two 
documents set out the general principles that it expects to apply when dealing with 
competition cases that may arise, and the detailed procedures it will follow in 
investigating cases. For instance, the Competition Guidelines sets up a three-stage 
procedure, which is similar to those used by European, Australian and US competition 
authorities, that the BA will use in handling all kinds of competition cases:  
Stage 1: Define the relevant market;   
Stage 2: Assess market power and/or the presence of agreements or practices; 
and  
Stage 3: Assess whether there is an abuse of a dominant position or substantial 
effect on competition and, hence, on consumers and viewers. 
 
With respect to market definition, the Competition Guidelines contain detailed 
discussion of factors such as demand-side substitution, supply-side substitution, 
switching costs, geographic locations, etc. For assessing market power, quantitative 
thresholds are set in terms of market share. Specifically, a licensee is unlikely to be 
individually dominant if its market share is below 40%. A licensee with a market share 
persistently above 50% is presumed to be a dominant firm. In relation to the prohibition 
on anti-competitive conduct, agreements among competitors will not generally have 
substantial effects, if the combined market share of the parties is less than 25%.13  
 
3. REMEDIES AND PENALTIES 
The sector-based rules also spell out the remedies for violation of the rules. Depending 
on the severity and nature of a violation, the TA or BA can issue either a warning or a 
direction (requiring a licensee to cease and desist from the action prohibited by the 
rules). A financial penalty can be imposed for “very serious” cases. For extremely 
serious cases, the license of the operator may be suspended. Initially, the financial 
penalties that could be imposed were small. Prior to 2000 the maximum fine that the 
TA could impose for violations of the competition provisions or breaches of a license 
contract was HK$20,000 for the first; HK$50,000 for the second occasion on which the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
company, refusal to supply, bundling, and price discrimination. 
13 The 50% threshold level for presumed dominant position in the broadcasting industry is, of course, 
stricter than the 75% level set for the telecommunications markets. Such different treatment might have 
to do with the political consideration that a dominant control in broadcasting may endanger the freedom 
of speech, which has long been regarded as of supreme importance for Hong Kong society. 
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penalty is so imposed; and HK$100,000 for any subsequent occasion on which the 
penalty is imposed. These figures were raised to $200,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 
respectively in early 2000 when the Telecommunications Ordinance was amended. The 
amended Ordinance also provided that for extremely serious violations, the TA can 
request the Court of Law to impose a financial penalty not exceeding 10% of the 
turnover of the licensee in the relevant market in the period of the breach, or $10 
million, whichever is higher.14 The guidelines for the broadcasting industry state that 
the penalty for violations of the Broadcasting Ordinance is an amount not exceeding 
10% of the turnover of the licensee in the relevant market in the period of the breach, or 
HK$2,000,000, whichever is higher.  
 
4. APPEAL MECHANISMS 
As authorized by the Telecommunications Ordinance, the Telecommunications 
(Competition Provisions) Appeal Broad has established to hear appeals against the 
TA’s decisions. The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR Government appoints the 
Chairman of the Appeal Board and the Deputy Chairman for a term of not exceeding 
two years. In hearing an appeal, two additional panel members will be appointed by the 
Chairman. The Appeal Board’s decision is final.  
 
IV. Enforcement: Cases from the Telecommunications Industry  
The government’s sectoral approach to competition policy has a very short history, but 
a relatively large number of cases have been considered, especially in the 
telecommunications industry. Table 1 provides data on the competition cases that the 
TA has considered from 1999 to September 2001.15 As can be seen, although over half 
of the cases were on advertisement conduct, quite some important competition cases 
have been considered during this short period of time. To illustrate the working of 
government’s sectoral approach, we now discuss three cases that the TA has dealt with. 
These cases are reviewed in chronically in order to illustrate the evolution of regulatory 
                                                           
14 In February 1999, Hong Kong Telecom, the dominant operator in the provision of IDD services, was 
fined $50,000 by the TA for having repeatedly violated the contract term that prohibited it from offering 
unauthorized discounts to its customers. This incident was one of the driving forces behind the 
amendment of the Telecommunications Ordinance. In the press release, the Head of the TA stated “I 
have also considered the more severe penalty of suspending the company’s license but this would cause 
too much disruption to all the customers of Hong Kong Telecom.” (See TA Press Release, February 12 
1999.) 
15 The Broadcasting Authority has not yet received any competition complaint since it issued the 
competition guidelines in February 2001. 
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decision-making. 
 
 
Table 1.  Competition cases completed by the Telecommunications Authority 
 
      Number of Cases 
Type of Case     1997-98      1999     2000    2001 (Sept.)     Total 
 
Price-Fixing              1                0  1 
 
Predatory Pricing              1       1  0  2 
 
Mergers/Acquisition              3                0                  1          0  4 
 
Unauthorized Discount            8       1  0  9 
 
Breach of Advertising Code           22       13  5  40 
 
Exclusive Dealing             2        0  0  2 
 
Undue Discrimination/ 
Unfair Cross-Subsidization            3        0  0  3 
 
Customers Related Complaint           3         2  3  8 
 
Operation without License            0         0  3  3 
 
Others               6         0  0  6 
 
   Total:           45           19  11  75 
  
Source: The Office of the Telecommunications Authority, Hong Kong 
 
 
1. ACQUISITION IN THE MOBILE PHONE SERVICE MARKET 
The telecommunications industry has undergone drastic structural changes in recent 
years. In 1995, new entrants were permitted by the government to compete with the 
incumbent (Hong Kong Telecom) which had enjoyed a monopoly position for decades 
in the FTNS markets. Shortly after the government formally announced its competition 
policy, the TA faced first major test of the sectoral approach when it had to deal with 
several merger cases. 
 
On December 3 1997, the TA approved the application by Hong Kong Telecom CSL 
Limited to acquire Pacific Link Communications Limited, the fourth largest mobile 
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phone player in the market.  The transaction made CSL the biggest mobile phone 
operator in Hong Kong, jumping from the second largest player prior to the deal. The 
TA approved the acquisition without imposing conditions just one week after receiving 
the application. In considering it, the TA’s primary concerns were whether competition 
in the market would be adversely affected, whether consumer interest has been 
adequately safeguarded, whether the regulatory environment would be compromised, 
and whether economic efficiency would be reduced.16  
 
To assess the possible effect on competition and consumers, the TA looked at factors 
such as choices available to consumers, the number of competing systems, market 
concentration and market dominance, and concluded that the proposed acquisition 
would not adversely affect competition in the market. The market “could not be 
considered to be too concentrated” even though the market share of CSL would be 
around 40% after the merger. The TA believed that “no operator in the mobile phone 
market would be dominant after the acquisition of Pacific Link by CSL.”  The TA also 
found that “there is nothing in the CSL acquisition of Pacific Link to suggest that 
economic efficiency would be reduced. In fact, the contrary may occur. By allowing 
CSL to acquire more spectrum to meet its needs to provide a better service to its 
customers, economic efficiency could be enhanced. The merging of Pacific Link’s 
network facilities with CSL’s would also result in efficiency gain.” 
 
The third concern of the TA, whether the regulatory environment would be 
compromised, is of particular interest, as one year prior to the proposed transaction, 
both CSL and Pacific Link, along with several other firms in the industry, participated 
in bidding for PCS (Personal Communication Services) licenses organized by the TA. 
Hutchison (the largest mobile phone operator prior to the acquisition) and Pacific Link 
were successful in obtaining a license whereas CSL was not. Now that CSL was 
proposing to acquire Pacific Link and that, as the regulator of the telecommunications 
industry that issues telecommunication licenses, the TA decided to let the acquisition 
go ahead. This naturally led to criticisms. In particular, the decision was said to have 
compromised the regulatory environment because a loser in the PCS bidding exercise 
could simply buy a license back.17  
                                                           
16 See TA Press Release, December 3,1997, and Economic Services Bureau (1998).  
17  Some analysts criticized the deal as a back-door entry by Hong Kong Telecom into the personal 
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2. ACQUISITION IN THE INTERNET MARKET 
There were over 130 licensed Internet service operators in Hong Kong at the time when 
Hong Kong Telecom IMS and Star Internet, two major firms in the market, submitted 
their application for approval of the acquisition of Star Internet by IMS in November 
1998.  Compared with its handling of the case reviewed above, the TA’s approach in 
this case exhibited distinct features. Prior to making a decision on the proposed 
acquisition, the TA through a press release laid out the main factors it would consider 
(effect on competition, consumer interests, continuity and quality of services to existing 
customers, etc.) in making a decision. It was also made clear that “the TA may impose 
conditions as appropriate.” Furthermore, TA formally and publicly invited views from 
interested parties on the proposed transaction. In response to this invitation, several 
parties submitted their opinions. Among them, the Hong Kong Internet Service 
Providers Association (HKISPA) strongly opposed the proposed acquisition. A 
pro-consumer body, the Hong Kong Telecommunication Users Group, held the same 
view. The Consumer Council also expressed its concerns over the case and suggested 
that the TA use merger and acquisition tests involving concentration ratios that are used 
in foreign jurisdictions.18  
 
Market share and the possibility of abuse of a dominant position were major concerns 
among both the government and other parties in this case. According to the TA, the Star 
acquisition would give IMS a 51% share of the market, a share that was substantially 
higher than that of the next largest player in the market.19 After reviewing 
characteristics of the market such as a large number of competitors, low entry barriers, 
low consumer switching costs, etc., the TA came to the conclusion that “it would be 
extremely difficult for an operator to abuse its position, by, for example, raising prices 
above the competitive level,” and on December 23, 1998, it gave its consent to the 
acquisition. However, it imposed the two conditions prohibiting abuse of a dominant 
position and unfair cross-subsidies to the operation of IMS.20   
                                                                                                                                                                          
communication service industry. See Hong Kong Standard, December 4, 1997. 
18 See Consumer Council (1998). 
19 The next two largest firms were HKNet and City Telecom, which had a combined market share of no 
more than 10% (Hong Kong Standard, December 24, 1998). 
20 HKISPA questioned the TA’s assessment of the market shares and said an internal survey it had 
conducted showed that the acquisition would give IMS a market share of as high as 70%. It also argued 
that the two special conditions imposed fell short of preventing the combined firm from abusing its 
 13
 
3. TACIT COLLUSION AMONG MOBILE PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS 
On January 2, 2000, all six licensed mobile phone service providers in Hong Kong 
simultaneously announced their decisions to raise the monthly subscription fees (for 
their major service plans). All the providers raised the fee for their basic monthly 
packages by HK$20 with the exception of Cable & Wireless Hong Kong Telecom CSL 
Limited, the dominant firm in the sector, which raised its fee by HK$10. The 
announced fee adjustment amounted to about 20% to 25% increase, and affected 3.6 
million mobile phone users in Hong Kong. The TA was informed of the fee increase ex 
post via immediate, widespread negative responses of mobile phone users in the local 
media. 
 
The companies justified the fee increases by citing losses due to the price wars that had 
been occurring since 1999. While denying any cooperative effort regarding the timing 
and amount of the fee increases, the service providers admitted to the TA that the CEOs 
or senior staff met two or three times from November to December 1999, to discuss 
issues of common concerns. On at least one of the meetings, they admitted discussing 
the issue of passing the license fee to customers. No notes were kept of these meetings. 
The TA immediately launched an investigation into whether the price increases had 
violated any of the competition conditions set in the licensee contracts of the 
companies. On January 15, 2000 the TA formed the opinion that "at very least some 
kind of 'arrangement' must have existed, which led to the simultaneous price 
adjustments," and invited the six providers to make representations on why the TA 
should not issue a direction. They all agreed to rescind the price increases in their 
entirety. In view of the prompt cancellation of the price increases, the TA decided not to 
issue a direction, but instead, wrote to each of the six providers warning them that in 
future they should ensure that they comply with their licensee obligations. No penalty 
was imposed on the companies (Telecommunications Authority (2000)).21 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
dominant position, as no remedy existed that could effectively punish HKIMS if it engaged in 
anti-competitive actions (HKISPA, Press Release, December 23, 1998). 
21 The TA’s quick action was widely applauded, but three months after the incident, in April 2000, some 
of the companies involved again raised their prices by $20. As the adjustments were made sequentially, 
rather than simultaneously, the TA did not launch an investigation this time. 
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V. An Assessment of Hong Kong’s Competition Policy Framework  
The current competition policy framework is transparent. For a given sector and the 
types of conduct covered, the rules set are comprehensive, governing almost all of the 
practices that are prohibited in the antitrust laws of developed countries. During the 
three years since the establishment of the competition policy, the government (the TA 
in particular) has handled many competition cases, in an open, transparent and timely 
manner. Although the procedures adopted and the technical analyses used in those 
dealings are not as nearly sophisticated as those used by other antitrust jurisdictions, 
and certain decisions reached were highly controversial, the government seems to be 
satisfied with its current approach to competition policy.  
 
Before adopting this policy, the government was aware of the views on the pros and 
cons of a sectoral approach. For instance, according to the Consumer Council, a 
sectoral approach is “piece meal” and fails to provide comprehensive guidelines in a 
consistent manner; competition provisions in different sectors may be subject to 
different interpretations and carry different penalties; and a sectoral approach may be 
prone to the capture of regulators by interest groups.22 The government, on the other 
hand, stressed that a sectoral approach is less expensive to set up; it can take into 
account industry specifics and thus provides greater certainty to the business 
community; it helps avoid over-kills; and that it does not see the need to introduce a 
competition law to Hong Kong at this stage. 
 
We agree with the Consumer Council and support a broad competition law approach. 
As well as the arguments made by the Council, we identify two additional, yet 
fundamental, drawbacks of the sectoral approach.  
 
1. DISTORTION OF THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES IN THE LONG RUN 
From a general viewpoint, a sectoral approach may hinder the efficient allocation of 
resources across different sectors of the economy. In choosing which sectors to invest 
in, private agents follow not only price signals, they also consider the ‘institutional 
costs’ of operating in different environments. Under a sectoral approach, different 
sectors will inevitably have different sector-specific rules of the game. These rules are 
                                                           
22 Consumer Council (1996), p.32, and Consumer Council (1999). 
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enforced by different regulatory agencies which may interpret the rules differently, 
follow different criteria, and have different enforcement experiences. One may then 
expect that, other things being equal, “fair players” and/or weak players would prefer to 
enter sectors where competition rules are perceived as complete and fair, so that they 
are less likely to be bullied by dominant firms, whereas “nasty players” would choose 
sectors where competition rules are either absent or lenient so that they would face less 
disciplinary restrictions. Different “institutional environments” therefore imply 
different rates of return on investment, which will unavoidably affect private investors’ 
decisions as to which sectors to enter. In the long run, the potential distortion of a 
sectoral approach on resource allocation across sectors should not be ignored.23 
 
2. THE DUAL ROLES OF THE ECONFORCER AND INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY 
Under the current sector-based competition policy, various government regulatory 
agencies must perform dual roles. On the one hand, as regulators of natural monopolies, 
these agencies must fulfill their traditional regulatory duties, such as issuing and 
administrating business licenses, and reviewing and monitoring the prices and qualities 
of regulated firms. On the other hand, they are the judges when competition complaints 
and allegations are brought against the firms they regulate.24 For simplicity, we name 
these two roles as regulator and enforcer, respectively. In other antitrust jurisdictions, 
these two roles are in general performed by separate agencies. 
 
An effective enforcement of competition rules requires fair and independent decisions 
on competition complaints.  But to act fairly and independently is a separate matter 
from being able to convince the concerned parties and the public that one has done so. 
The ruling in a competition case affects not only the parties concerned in the case, but it 
also influence the future behavior of other firms. It is therefore extremely important for 
                                                           
23 The arguments provided here are analogous to those often made regarding the relationship between 
foreign direct investment and competition policy. When considering investment options in different 
markets, foreign companies place a high premium on the country that has the most developed legal 
system in terms of allowing access and protection to the investment, reducing administrative burdens and 
addressing the distortions of competitive process. 
24 For example, the TA’s responsibilities “include economic regulation, technical regulation, enforcing 
fair competition rules, setting technical standards, coordinating the development of the 
telecommunications infrastructure, investigating consumers and industry complaints, managing the radio 
spectrum, providing advice to the Government on telecommunications matters and representing Hong 
Kong in international telecommunications organizations.” See TA’s web site: www.ofta.gov.hk 
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the enforcer to make sure not only that justice is done, but also that justice is seen to be 
done. However, when the very same agency is responsible for two inter-related duties, 
it is difficult for outsiders to believe that decisions concerning one such duty are made 
independently of considerations of the other duty. Having to perform the dual roles, 
often conflict with one another, the enforcers under a sectoral approach face an 
information problem in communicating its impartiality to the public. 
 
An information problem arises because the general public, as well as the parties to a 
competition case, do not observe perfectly the regulator’s decision making in 
performing either of its roles.25 Although a competition case can be open to the public 
throughout, it is impossible for the public to know exactly how a regulator interacts 
with the firms it regulates on a daily basis, especially with long-time incumbents with 
which regulators often have close working or even personal relationships. It is then 
natural for the public to presume biased decisions by the enforcer/regulator. The burden 
of proof thus lies with the regulator.26 Unless it is solely an enforcer, it is difficult for the 
agency to prove it behaves independently in making competition rulings. 
 
The information problem can be illustrated in the telecommunications cases presented 
in section IV. In the CSL-Pacific Link acquisition case, the TA was criticized of having 
compromised the regulatory environment by allowing the loser in a license bidding 
process to buy back a license.27 The TA was having difficulties defending its position 
because it was unable to convince critics that it had acted fairly in both granting mobile 
phone licenses and in approving the acquisition. Similarly, the TA was not able to 
establish that its approval of the transaction was independent of its on-going 
negotiation with HK Telecom (CSL’s parent) on termination of HK Telecom’s 
exclusive licensing contract in the international calls market. Since the government had 
to compensate HK Telecom for early termination of its monopoly status, questions 
were raised as to whether the TA's approval of CSL's acquisition of Pacific Link was 
related to the terms of the negotiation. Specifically, it was asked whether the approval 
                                                           
25 The standard information problem pertaining to regulation refers to the difficulty of obtaining (cost) 
information from the regulated firm. (See Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Kahn (1993)). We here 
emphasize the difficulty for the enforcer to explain to the public its independent decision-making when it 
also serves as a regulator.  
26 The tendency to presume biased decisions is certainly strong when the competition decisions concern 
an incumbent firm versus newcomers, or domestic firms versus foreign firms, 
27 In a subsequent case involving acquisition of P Plus by Smartone Telecommunications Limited, 
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of HKT's acquisition was a part of the "compensation package" for the early 
termination of the monopoly contract.28 In cases like this, the dual roles of the TA 
provide the very cause of the criticisms and the obstacle for the TA to prove its 
innocence. Had an independent authority approved the acquisition and the TA been 
responsible for making license decisions only, there probably would not have been such 
criticisms. We are not claiming, nor do we believe, that the TA was “captured” by any 
interest groups. Our point is that, empowered with the dual roles, the TA actually 
suffers from its inability to convince the public that its decisions on competition issues 
are independently made from those related to its traditional regulatory duties.  
 
In our view, the foregoing criticisms of the TA’s dealing of the cases are not specific to 
these individual cases. Rather, they reflect the general drawback of a sectoral approach 
that stems from the presence of asymmetric information, and will likely arise in other 
sectors as well. Having to perform traditional regulatory duties hinders a government 
agency’s ability to establish itself as an independent competition policy enforcer. 
Consequently, the agency’s reputation and effectiveness in performing either role may 
be undermined. 
 
3. STRUCTURAL ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED  
Having argued for the general drawbacks of a sectoral approach, we now turn to some 
problems specific to the current practice of the government. 
 
As described earlier, the current competition policy of Hong Kong focuses on business 
conduct (anti-competitive practices and abuse of market power) only.29 As it now 
stands, the competition policy framework cannot adequately and effectively deal with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
approved by the TA in March 1998, exactly the same criticism was once again raised. 
28 See Hong Kong Standard, December 4, 1997. In January 1998, shortly after its approval of the 
acquisition case, the TA announced that it would compensate Hong Kong Telecom about US$858.97 
million (net of tax) for surrendering this exclusive right. 
29 The reasons for the government to have left structural issues out are unknown. It does not seem to be 
the case that the government simply followed the Consumer Council’s suggestion to defer introduction 
of structural provisions at a later stage.  The ‘conduct-only’ approach is probably due to the 
government’s reluctance to introduce a competition law and its concern of over-kills. An alternative 
explanation is that, given its positive non-intervention approach, the government probably regarded 
mergers and acquisitions as normal business transactions and should thus be left for market to decide. 
However, given the conventional wisdom that market structure is a main factor influencing firm conduct 
(the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Bain (1959)), control of anticompetitive conduct is 
unlikely to be effective unless structural issues are addressed. (Kwoka and White (1994) contains 
detailed economic analysis of the effects of industry structures on firm conduct in influential antitrust 
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structural issues, such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As). In the telecommunications 
industry, for example, the control of M&As occurs mainly through conditions in the 
licensing agreements between the government and license holders. No single industry 
in Hong Kong now has competition legislation that governs M&As. Even in the 
banking industry, which has seen a lot of M&A activity in recent years, explicit 
regulatory provisions to govern structural changes do not exist.30 Prompted by the cases 
it has handled recently, the TA now sees the need to introduce new legislation for the 
regulation of M&As in the telecommunications industry. In April 2001, it issued a 
consultation paper that both evaluates the existing regulatory regime for M&As and 
proposes new regulations, including draft guidelines the TA will follow in considering 
proposals for M&As.31  Whether or not the proposed regulations will become law in the 
future, the proposal itself underscores the need for the government to incorporate 
conditions governing structural issues into its existing competition policy framework.  
 
Without specific provisions governing M&As, the government is not in a position to 
effectively prevent structural changes that can potentially be detrimental to competition 
and consumer interest. Take the supermarket industry in Hong Kong as an example. 
The supermarket industry has been dominated by two giant chain stores, Park'n Shop 
and Wellcome, which have held around 80% of the market share since the early 
1990s.32 Despite its near duopoly status, competition in the industry has been quite 
intense.33 However, if the two firms decided to merge with one another, there would be 
no legal basis whatsoever for the government to do anything to prevent it. Obviously, 
social welfare would be greatly lowered should such a merger occur. Given that it is 
extremely costly, both technically and economically, to reverse a large merger 
transaction, the damages caused by such a merger would be long lasting even if the 
government subsequently extended its current competition policy to cover structural 
issues and take ex post action against this merger. We believe that the government 
should realize the potential danger of such detrimental structural changes and take steps 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cases in the United States.) 
30 Just early this year, The Development Bank of Singapore was able to purchase the fourth largest bank 
in Hong Kong, DongHeng Bank, without having to obtain government approval of any sort.  
31 TA Press Release of April 17, 20001. 
32 South China Morning Post, August 9, 2000. 
33 The French-based company, Carrefour, entered the market in 1996, and managed to open only four 
hypermarkets in Hong Kong by 2000. Having suffered big losses, it withdrew from Hong Kong in 
September 2000. The company blamed the restrictive behavior of incumbent firms, as well the 
government’s land policy, for its departure. 
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to include M&As within the coverage of its competition policy.  
 
4. BROADING THE COVERAGE OF SECTORS 
Another feature of the current competition policy is that it covers only a small number 
of sectors. The telecommunications and the broadcasting industries are perhaps the 
only two industries in Hong Kong that have specific competition provisions to govern 
their daily operations. Other sectors, by and large, do not yet have a sector-based 
competition policy framework in place. Even the banking industry, perhaps the most 
important sector in the economy, has yet to face explicit competition rules, despite 
numerous complaints about certain banks reported in the media over recent years.34 
Another sector wherein oligopolistic practices have caused widespread competition 
concerns comprises the markets for gasoline, diesel and liquefied petroleum gas.  The 
Consumer Council conducted a detailed study of these markets in as early as 1995, and 
another study of the persistent practices of major gas and fuel companies in 1999. It 
recommended in early 2000 that the government set up an Energy Commission that 
which would have the task of regulating anti-competitive behavior in the oil products 
market, similar to that of the TA.35 The government has not yet responded to these 
recommendations. Besides the banking and the oil products markets, anti-competitive 
practices have also been alleged to have occurred in industries such as newspapers, 
supermarket retailing, and housing conveyance services. Because a counterpart of the 
TA does not exist in these industries, the alleged practices have remained untouched.  
 
In our view that the current competition policy should be extended to cover a larger 
number of sectors, which display substantial evidence of anti-competitive practices, 
and to cover structural issues such as mergers and acquisitions, as well as conduct. 
Mergers and acquisitions will become even more prevalent in Hong Kong as China 
enters the WTO, and in an era of rapid technological change. 
 
5. LACK OF ACTIVE PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
Since the inception of its competition policy, the government through its regulators has 
                                                           
34 One such incident is the controversial fee increase in 2000 by the Easy Payment System Corp., a 
consortium of about 35 banks in Hong Kong that provides electronic debit services to local merchants. 
35 In the absence of a general competition authority, the Consumer Council recommended the 
establishment of such an agency within the government’s sectoral approach.  See Consumer Council 
(2000).  
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been acting passively as a referee in resolving complaints and disputes. It rarely, if ever, 
initiates a competition case itself and then brings it to the “court.” The current 
enforcement of competition policy depends primarily on private enforcement, as 
opposed to public enforcement. For instance, almost all the cases handled by the TA in 
the past three years (presented in Table 1) were reported in the form of complaints by 
either rivals, customers, or the Consumer Council. 
 
Under the current policy setting, the burden of proof in a given competition case lies to 
a large extent with the plaintiff or the complainant. For instance, it is stated explicitly in 
the "Competition Investigation Procedures" published by the Broadcasting Authority 
that a complainant must provide necessary information to convince the government that 
the complaint is valid. Complainants need to answer fourteen questions so as to provide 
"the information required to commence the investigation." One of the questions 
contains 22 parts, all pertaining to rather technical aspects of antitrust analysis such as 
(1) How do you define the relevant market? (2) What is the level of competition in the 
relevant market? (3) What is the effect on competition of the behavior complained 
about? And (4) What are the possible remedies? 36 Since most firms in Hong Kong do 
not have detailed knowledge about competition laws and analysis, such information 
requirements impose a great burden on the part of complainants.  
 
The passive attitude of the government towards competition policy enforcement is 
consistent with its general positive non-intervention policy toward business activity. 
However, private enforcement alone is not enough. In many situations, plaintiffs may 
not be willing to come forward to report anti-competitive conduct.  They may fear 
retaliation, if they complain about a dominant firm. Or, the standard free-riding 
problem may exist, if there are a large number of plaintiffs. The role of government 
enforcement in such cases is essential. More active public enforcement in both 
collecting relevant information and bringing cases, together with private enforcement, 
would greatly increase the deterrent effect of competition policy.37 
 
                                                           
36 Broadcasting Authority (2001). 
37 Most economists favor a combination of private and public enforcement. See Areeda and Turner 
(1978). For the weaknesses of each type of enforcement, see Martin (1994, Chapter 18). 
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6. THE ROLE OF THE COMPAG 
The Competition Policy Advisory Group (COMPAG) was set up in December 1997 
under the chairmanship of the financial secretary.38 Its roles are “to provide a high level, 
dedicated forum to review issues related to competition which have substantial policy 
or systemic implications, and to examine the extent to which more competition is 
needed in both the public and private sectors” (COMPAG Report 1998). After its 
establishment, COMPAG’s work has been focused on reviewing existing practices 
alleged to be anticompetitive, considering new initiatives to foster competition, and on 
tracking competition-related complaints. The published COMPAG reports for 1998 
and 1999-2000 list the measures taken by the various government bureaus and 
departments to foster competition. By early 2000, twenty-eight competition-related 
complaints were received by or referred to COMPAG by different parties, including 
government bureaus and the Consumer Council (COMPAG (2000)).39 COMPAG 
looked into all these complaints and the follow-up actions by the concerned parties, but, 
for substantiated cases, it is the relevant government bureaus and departments (such as 
the TA) that make decisions, although COMPAG gives advice when necessary. 
 
The establishment of COMPAG is a part of the government’s response to the Consumer 
Council’s recommendation to set up an overall competition law and a general 
competition authority. Its role so far has been primarily to keep track of all competition 
complaints referred to the government. However, the symbolic role of the COMPAG 
should not be underestimated. The mere establishment of COMPAG signals the 
government’s determination to combat anti-competitive behavior, albeit on a sectoral 
basis. However, the credibility of COMPAG may be undermined unless it becomes 
more actively engaged in promoting competition in Hong Kong. For example, 
COMPAG could make known to the public the government’s views and/or actions on 
major or controversial competition cases. The government’s determination and its 
ability to promote competition should be continuously conveyed to the general public, 
which needs to be better educated on competition issues. 
                                                           
38 COMPAG comprises high level government officials, including the Secretary for Trade and Industry, 
the Secretary for the Treasury, the Secretary for Economics Services, the Government Economist, the 
Director-General of Trade, and the Director of Business Service Promotion Unit. Outside observers, such 
as the Consumer Council, may be invited on a need basis. 
39 There does seem to be confusion among the public about the role of COMPAG. For instance, seven out 
of the twelve complaints received by COMPAG from February 1999 to March 2000 were against various 
government bureaus regarding their unfair practices in dealing with the private sector. These cases were 
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VI. Developing a Culture for Competition 
It is fair to say that an overall environment that is favorable to establishing a modern 
antitrust system has yet to be developed in Hong Kong, and it may be a long time before 
a general competition law comes into existence.  
 
The general public, including some government officials, has various misconceptions 
regarding the roles of competition law. Some hold the view that being competitive in 
international markets and the absence of any trade barriers imply that the Hong Kong 
economy as a whole is immune from anti-competitive conduct, thereby ignoring the 
difference between tradable goods and non-tradable goods markets. Some regard 
competition laws as a means to protect certain groups of players, rather than to protect 
competition.40 Still others believe that antitrust would necessarily lead to infringement 
of free market efficiency and that setting up rules is equivalent to imposing regulation 
on private business activities. Many do not see the possibility and danger of business 
firms intentionally hurting competitors and consumers by abusing their market power.  
Some even regard possession of market power as an indication of business success, and 
thus viewing abusing it as a legitimate act. Historically, firms in Hong Kong are not shy 
of cooperating with one another.41 Even today, rival firms sometimes publicly 
announce their intention to cooperate with one another, although often in an attempt to 
reduce hard feelings or hostility toward one another. In short, setting rules for 
competition is widely regarded, by government officials, businessmen and the public in 
general, as contradicting with the laissez faireism. 
 
Unlike in some western countries, where competition laws are seen as a means to 
promote democracy, antirust is regarded by many in Hong Kong as a purely economic 
matter unrelated to the democratic development of a society.42 Although there exists  
resentment against big companies being able to influence the government in Hong 
                                                                                                                                                                          
found by COMPAG to be either unsubstantiated or not needing follow-up actions. 
40 The fact that the Hong Kong Consumer Council has been the primary advocate of competition law 
may have reinforced to the belief that antitrust exists to protect consumers and is anti-business. 
41 For instance, in 1913 two major ship-builders, Hong Kong & Whampoa Dock Co. and Taikoo 
Dockyard Co., agreed to form a cartel after a long period of cut throat competition between the two. (See 
Fung (1999), Chapter 3). 
42 For example, one of the goals of setting up the antitrust system in the US over one hundred years ago 
was to protect the democratic movement of the nation by preventing economic power from being too 
concentrated around big companies. See Hofstadter (1991), pp.199-200. 
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Kong, many do not realize that concentration of economic power may threaten 
democracy. As in most East Asian countries, Hong Kong does yet not have a modern 
democratic system in place. We believe that as Hong Kong society becomes more 
mature democratically, the demand for a competition law will increase.   
 
The Hong Kong government has been facing direct external pressures from 
international organizations and trading partners in relation to competition issues. For 
instance, competition policy has been an important aspect considered by the WTO 
when conducting its trade policy reviews of Hong Kong every four years. The 
adequacy of Hong Kong’s competition policy was raised in the WTO's 1998 report, 
along with other issues such as copyright piracy.43 However, the pressure from the 
WTO on competition issues has had only a minimal effect on the government’s attitude 
towards competition law, as the WTO members are not obligated, so far at least, to 
establish any sort of competition policy.44   
 
Competition complaints in the future will surface from within the Hong Kong 
economy, as business firms face more fierce competition after China joints the WTO 
and when Hong Kong will no longer be the only major gateway to the China market. 
Increased external pressure, whether direct or indirect, will certainly accelerate the 
government’s effort to address the issue of competition. To educate the public about the 
roles of antitrust, which the Consumer Council has been doing tirelessly, is certainly an 
effective way to develop a culture for fair competition.  A meaningful thing for the 
government to do is to take advantage of the competition cases it has dealt with, such as 
those in the telecommunications industry, and use them to educate the public and to 
clarify the misconceptions discussed earlier. 
                                                           
43 The WTO review committee cited the studies of the Consumer Council that had identified 
anti-competitive practices in various sectors. The Hong Kong representative reiterated the government’s 
stand that the introduction of a general competition law is not necessary, given Hong Kong's small, 
externally oriented, highly competitive economy.  See WTO (1998). 
44 Perhaps the most vocal external critics of the government's competition policy so far came from the 
European Union in its November 2000 parliamentary report on the political and economic environment 
in Hong Kong.  It expressed its concerns about an environment possibly titled against foreign companies, 
citing that "a number of tycoons have an undue and dominant influence in certain sectors of Hong Kong." 
The report called for a general competition law by saying that "as the existence of fair competition laws 
and practices ensure a level playing pitch for SAR [Special administration Region] firms when they 
compete in the EU marketplace, European Union businesses are entitled to reciprocation when they 
operate in Hong Kong." The Hong Kong government rejected this claim and defended economic 
freedom in Hong Kong in general terms, and reiterated its position that there is no need for Hong Kong to 
introduce a general competition law (South China Morning Post, October 27, 2000). 
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VI. Conclusions 
Given its long-time positive non-intervention philosophy, it is a big achievement for the 
Hong Kong government to have introduced a competition policy. The current 
competition policy framework is simple, transparent, and has shown its capability of 
combating restrictive business practices in the sectors it covers. Relative to a general 
competition law, a sector-based policy is less expensive to put into place, easy to 
operate, and can better take sector specifics into account. Its drawbacks include 
potential inconsistency among the rules covering different sectors, coordination failure 
among various enforcement agencies, and possible capture by industry interest groups. 
Although recent enforcement experience in the telecommunications industry provides 
no evidence of industry capture public concerns have arisen over the fairness of 
decisions made in various cases. Under the “dual roles” setting inherent to the sectoral 
approach, competition policy enforcers engage in traditional business with the firms in 
their corresponding industries, making it difficult for the agencies to establish a 
reputation of independence. It should be realized that while they may have acted fairly, 
it might not be easy to convince the public that they have done so. 
 
We believe that a comprehensive competition law with an independent enforcement 
body can better promote competition and economic efficiency in Hong Kong, as the 
Consumer Council has been advocating since the mid 1990s.45 First, the consistency of 
competition provisions for all sectors of the economy should not be undervalued, 
especially so in an era of rapid technological change which blurs the boundary of the 
traditional markets. The government should consider how to better balance consistency 
of rules against simplicity and sector specifics. Second, having an independent 
enforcement body that is unrelated to any traditional regulatory duties can overcome 
the information problem inherent in the sectoral approach, as discussed in Section V. 
Such a body with greater investigatory powers will also help deter violations of 
competition rules. Third, lessons should be drawn from international antitrust 
experience. To avoid over-kill, a system similar to the one in the European Community 
is perhaps most suitable for Hong Kong. However, it may be a long time before an 
effective antitrust system is established. It is difficult to set up an effective antitrust 
                                                           
45 Cheng and Wu (1998, 2000) also argue that a competition law is a necessary underpinning for a 
comprehensive competition policy in Hong Kong.  
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system from scratch in any economy. It is much more difficult to do so in an economy 
that has benefited so much from unfettered market conduct. The misconceptions about 
the roles of antitrust need to be corrected, the general public educated, and a culture for 
fair competition developed. 
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